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JUDICIAL ATTITUDE TOWARD POLITICAL QUESTION
DOCTRINE: THE GERRYMANDER AND CIVIL RIGHTS
I conclude that the doctrine of political question is currently
undergoing a most undesirable expansion. Because it may well
exclude important claims of individual liberty from any judicial
review, it is contrary to the spirit of our institutions and ought
to be confined to situations in which it is imperative.1
The political question doctrine, which Professor Frank concluded is
expanding in a very undesirable direction, has been recently applied
by a federal court in exactly the manner which he prophesied.2 In the
summer of 1957, the Alabama legislature passed an act entitled "An
Act To alter, re-arrange, and re-define the boundaries of the City of
Tuskegee in Macon County.' ' 3 The act stated in specific detail the
territory to be included in the City of Tuskegee, and excluded all
territory lying outside the newly defined boundaries.
Prior to the passage of the act, the boundaries of Tuskegee formed
a square. After the passage of the act, however, the boundaries as
redefined, resembled a "sea dragon."' 4 The effect of the act was to
remove from Tuskegee all but four or five of the qualified Negro
voters (out of a total of about 400), and none of the qualified white
voters.
Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment in the federal district
court invalidating the act on the grounds that, as to them, the act
was in violation of the due process and equal protection clauses of the
fourteenth amendment, and also of the fifteenth amendment of the
federal constitution. The district court granted a motion to dismiss
on the ground that the court did not have jurisdiction since "This
Court has no control over, no supervision over, and no power to change
any boundaries of municipal corporations fixed by a duly convened and
elected legislative body, acting for the people in the State of Ala-
bama."5 The court of appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district
court's holding by a 2-1 decision.- Judge Jones, writing the majority
opinion, felt that in the absence of any racial discrimination on the
face of the statute, it would be improper for the court to question the
motive of the legislature in passing the act. He also felt that this was a
1. Frank, Political Questions, in Supreme Court and Supreme Law 36, 43
(Calm ed. 1954).
2. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 270 F.2d 594 (5th Cir. 1959).
3. Ala. Acts 1957, No. 140, at 185.
4. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 167 F. Supp. 405, 407 (M.D. Ala. 1958).
5. Id. at 410.
6. Note 2 supra.
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political question, and thus not subject to judicial review. Judge
Wisdom, in a concurring opinion, placed the decision squarely on the
political question doctrine as presented in Colegrove v. Green7 and
South v. Peters.8
This case and the consequences which its holding augurs for further
disenfranchisement of the Southern Negro invites analysis of the
rationale of the political question doctrine, particularly the appropri-
ateness of that doctrine in the malapportionment or gerrymandering
cases.
Among the cases which have traditionally been considered non-
justiciable are those containing what the courts have labeled political
questions. Beginning in 1849 with the case of Luther v. Borden,9
when the Supreme Court refused to rule whether or not Rhode Island
had a republican form of government, the federal courts have re-
frained from taking jurisdiction over those cases which in their judg-
ment come under the purview of the other departments of government,
despite the fact that a controversy exists that might be settled by a
court. The cases in which the doctrine has been applied are quite
varied and have involved such questions as: (1) recognition of foreign
governments;1 (2) commencement and termination of war;11 (3)
jurisdiction over territory ;12 (4) status of Indian tribes; 13 (5) ad-
mission and deportation of aliens;14 (6) enforcement of treaties;15
(7) authority of foreign ambassadors and ministers6 and (8) estab-
lishment of electoral districts. 7 Once there has been a determina-
tion that a case is substantially concerned with a political question,
the case will be dismissed and the decision of the department of gov-
ernment involved will stand undisturbed.
Two major theories have been advanced to explain the political
question doctrine. Although each theory is grounded on a purportedly
different premise, it should be noted that, generally, either of the
theories would support the courts' decisions in this area.
7. 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
8. 339 U.S. 276 (1950).
9. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
10. Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918).
11. Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160 (1948); The Protector, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.)
700 (1871).
12. Wilson v. Shaw, 204 U.S. 24 (1907); In re Cooper, 143 U.S. 472 (1892).
13. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
14. The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581 (1889); Harisiades v. Shaugh-
nessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952).
15. Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796).
16. Sevilla v. Elizalde, 112 F.2d 29 (D.C. Cir. 1940); Doe v. Braden, 57 U.S.
(16 How.) 635 (1853).
17. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
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The first and most obvious explanation of the doctrine of political
question is to be found in the theory of separation of powers.1 This
is to say that a certain question is political if the power to decide it has
been delegated either expressly or by implication to the executive or
legislative branch of government. This theory follows naturally from
the checks and balances system under which the American tripartite
system of government was theoretically established. The Constitution
sets out the duties and responsibilities of the Legislative,", Executive 20
and Judicial departments.2 1 Under this theory if a court has before it
a case which, in its best judgment, involves a question within the juris-
diction of the executive or legislative branch, the court is obliged to
label that question political, and defer to the decision of the executive
or legislative branch, whichever has jurisdiction over the matter. If
this is the correct rationale, then, as is stated by the proponents of the
theory of separation of powers, the court is furnished with a guide
which is easily applied. Either the Constitution has conferred juris-
diction on the court, in a given case, or it has conferred it on another
branch of the government. If the latter, the case concerns a political
question and is thus beyond the scope of the court's power to decide.
The second theory usually advanced to explain the political question
doctrine is that of judicial self-limitation.22 This theory considers that
the courts, moved by reasons of expediency, have refrained from tak-
ing jurisdiction in certain types of cases. Three principal reasons have
been put forward as influential in causing a court to decide that action
on the merits will be inexpedient :23 (1) a belief that the court is in-
competent to deal with the question presented ;24 (2) fear of the vast-
ness of the consequences of a decision on the merits ;25 (3) a feeling
that the matter is "too high" for the courts.2 The implication of the
self-limitation theory is that the court will take cognizance of all the
circumstances involved in a particular case and if "political wisdom"21
dictates that it would be inexpedient to take jurisdiction, the political
question label will be affixed.
18. Weston, Political Questions, 38 Harv. L. Rev. 296 (1925).
19. U.S. Const. art. I.
20. U.S. Const. art. II.
21. U.S. Const art. III.
22. Finkelstein, Judicial Self-Limitation, 37 Harv. L. Rev. 338 (1924); Finkel-
stein, Further Notes on Judicial Self-Limitation, 39 Harv. L. Rev. 221 (1925).
The second article was written as an answer to Mr. Weston's article, supra note 18.
23. Finkelstein, Judicial Self-Limitation, 37 Harv. L. Rev. 338, 344-45 (1924).
24. E.g., Colegrove v. Green, supra note 17.
25. E.g., Luther v. Borden, supra note 9.
26. Mr. Finkelstein explains that cases which fall into this category are those
where the courts have said they will not question the motives of the legislature.
27. Finkelstein, supra note 23, at 345.
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It is interesting to note that in the leading case of Luther v. Bor-
den, 2 Mr. Chief Justice Taney applied both theories to explain why the
Court refused to adjudicate the merits of the case. A brief history of
the case will be helpful to set the colorful background of this famous
controversy. In the year 1841, Rhode Island was operating under the
old colonial charter which, with a few minor changes, served as its
constitution. The charter was a very rigid document. It contained no
procedure for amendment and the legislature, which was authorized
to prescribe the qualification of voters, had limited suffrage to free-
holders only.29 A large portion of the population was dissatisfied with
the charter, and particularly with the restrictions on voting. Thomas
W. Dorr, a citizen of Rhode Island, organized a constitutional conven-
tion which framed a constitution. The constitution was presented to
the people, voted upon, and passed by a majority of the male citizens
over the age of twenty-one. Accordingly, this constitution was pro-
claimed the supreme law of Rhode Island by the Dorr faction, and an
election was held under the new constitution for the officers of govern-
ment.
The charter government, of course, recognized none of these pro-
ceedings and in order to protect the government, declared martial law
in the state. Borden, as officer-in-charge of a small group of militia,
was ordered to arrest Luther, a known adherent of the "Dorr Re-
bellion," as it is known today. Carrying out his orders, Borden broke
into Luther's home and arrested him. Luther, after moving to Massa-
chusetts to establish diversity of citizenship, brought an action of
trespass quare clausum fregit against Borden in the United States
Circuit Court for the district of Rhode Island. Defendant's defense,
which prevailed in the circuit court, was that an officer of the estab-
lished government operating under martial law, had the right to arrest
an insurrectionist. Plaintiff, of course, claimed that since the adoption
of the new constitution, the charter government was not the estab-
lished government, and therefore did not have any rights in this
regard.
Thus, by way of an action for trespass, the Court was faced with
the question of determining whether the charter government of Rhode
Island was a republican form of government as guaranteed to the
states by the Constitution."0 The Court refused to come to the merits
of the case on the ground that this issue was political and, accordingly,
non-justiciable. Mr. Chief Justice Taney, in an oft-quoted portion of
his opinion, stated:
28. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
29. Id. at 35.
30. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 4.
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Under this article of the Constitution [Article 4 § 4] it rests
with Congress to decide what government is the established one
in a State. For as the United States guarantee to each State a
republican government, Congress must necessarily decide what
government is established in the State before it can determine
whether it is republican or not. And when the senators and repre-
sentatives of a State are admitted into the councils of the Union,
the authority of the Government under which they are appointed,
as well as its republican character, is recognized by the proper
constitutional authority. And its decision is binding on every
other department of the government, and could not be questioned
in a judicial tribunal. 31
Upon examination, it appears obvious that the Chief Justice is in-
voking the separation of powers doctrine to decide that the issue is a
political question. The Constitution has not delegated the matter to
the courts, but rather to the Congress. 32 As such, the Court must
follow the decision of the Congress.
But the Chief Justice was also quite evidently influenced by con-
siderations of expediency. Thus, in the same case, he also wrote:
For, if this court is authorized to enter upon this inquiry as pro-
posed by the plaintiff, and it should be decided that the charter
government had no legal existence during the period of time above
mentioned-if it had been annulled by the adoption of the oppos-
ing government-then the laws passed by its legislature during
this time were nullities; its taxes wrongfully collected; its salaries
and compensation to its officers illegally paid; its public accounts
improperly settled; and the judgment and sentences of its courts
in civil and criminal cases null and void, and the officers who
carried their decisions into operation answerable as trespassers,
if not in some cases as criminals.
When the decision of this court might lead to such results, it
becomes its duty to examine very carefully its own powers before
it undertakes to exercise jurisdiction.33
Dorr's cause was a popular one of the time. As far as the nation
was concerned, the issue was whether or not the people had the right
to change, in their own way, their form of government. The Demo-
cratic Party and the Democratic press were in full support of Dorr's
position, and the issue had split the country. It has even been sug-
gested that armed conflict might have resulted had the Supreme Court
decided the case on the merits.34 While this point was not made ex-
plicit in the opinion, the fact may well have been present in the Court's
mind, and hence have made a contrary decision even less expedient.
31. 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 42.
32. Note, however, that the language of Art. IV, section 4 of the Constitution
says, "The United States shall guarantee," rather than, "Congress shall guaran-
tee."
33. 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 38.
34. Frank, op. cit. supra note 1, at 40.
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Thus, either analysis will explain this case, and as a matter of fact,
this Court used both. It has been noted that the judicial self-limitation
theory is less doctrinaire than the separation of powers theory, and is
probably more reflective of the judicial process as it takes place in
the courts.35 The separation of powers implicit in the federal con-
stitution was antedated by numerous English cases which applied
the doctrine of the Act of State-the English parallel to the political
question.3"
It may well be that the theory of judicial self-limitation is merely a
more sophisticated version of the separation of powers theory. For
when a court has decided that a certain case is not a proper one for
judicial consideration, has it not decided that the function in question
is or should be the subject of executive or legislative, rather than
judicial action? And in making such a decision, has not the court
weighed the expediencies? Notwithstanding the unresolved argument
as to whether either theory, standing alone, offers a satisfactory ra-
tionale, there is little doubt that the doctrine of the political question
is firmly entrenched in our judicial system.
Whatever reasons a court may advance for its use of the doctrine,
it is apparent that there are many questions which courts cannot, or
at any rate, should not, decide. Notable among these are questions
that involve the making of the foreign policy of the United States,
where it would be disastrous for the government to speak with two
voices. On the other hand, there is one class of cases which courts
have consistently refused to consider, that can and should be resolved
by judicial determination. These are the political malapportionment
cases of which Colegrove v. Green37 is the leading example.
In this famous case, plaintiffs alleged that the vastly unequal con-
gressional districts in Illinois caused their vote to be so diluted as to
deny them equal protection of the law under the fourteenth amend-
ment. Plaintiffs asked the district court to declare the districts invalid
and to enjoin defendants from using them in the forthcoming con-
gressional election. The district court dismissed the complaint on
grounds other than that of the political question. The Supreme Court
affirmed the lower court's decision, but went further, and declared
that "the appellants ask of this Court what is beyond its competence to
grant."38 The case has been cited as standing for many things, due in
35. Note, Constitutional Objections To The Appointment Of A Member Of A
Legislature To Judicial Office, 6 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 46, 61 n.68 (1937).
36. Nabob of the Carnatic v. East India Co., 1 Ves. Jr. 370, 30 Eng. Rep. 391
(1791); 2 Ves. Jr. 56, 30 Eng. Rep. 521 (1793); The Duke of York's Claim. to the
Crown, 5 Rotuli Par. 375 (1460).
37. 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
38. Id. at 552.
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part to the unusual way the Court aligned itself on the issues. Only
seven Justices heard the case and split 4-3. The majority opinion,
written by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, stated that the Court had no juris-
diction since "The basis for the suit is not a private wrong, but a
wrong suffered by Illinois as a polity." 39 The opinion concludes with a
statement that the responsibility in this area of the law belongs to "the
people ...exercising their political rights.1140 The three dissenting
Justices argued that the Court had jurisdiction and favored the grant-
ing of the injunction. The deciding vote was cast in a concurring
opinion by Mr. Justice Rutledge, who agreed with the minority that
the Court had jurisdiction to decide the case on the merits, but felt that
the Court should refrain from exercising its equity powers because of
the damage a decree might inflict on the delicate and fragile area of
federal-state relationships.41 Thus, although the Court dismissed the
action, a majority felt that the Court did have jurisdiction to hear the
case.
In a subsequent case, MacDougall v. Green,42 the Progressive Party
asked for an injunction in a federal court against the enforcement of
an Illinois statute requiring candidates of a new political party to
present petitions signed by 25,000 qualified voters, including 200 sig-
natures for each of at least 50 counties in the state. The petitioners
obtained 75,000 signatures, but they did not meet the geographical
requirements. In praying for an injunction that the law be declared
invalid, plaintiffs alleged the violation of the due process, privileges
and immunities, and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amend-
ment. The Supreme Court affirmed a denial of the injunction, but the
decision was rendered on the merits, rather than on the ground that
the issue presented was a political question. Since the basic issues in
the two cases are very similar, it would appear that the decision in
the MacDougall case is somewhat of a withdrawal from the political
question position taken in the Colegrove case.
A third case which is continually cited for the proposition that
apportionment is a political question is South v. Peters.43 Here again
an injunction was sought in a federal court, this time to restrain the
enforcement of the Georgia county-unit statute, which greatly diluted
the vote of the urban population. 4  The Court, in a per curiam opinion
39. Ibid.
40. Id. at 556.
41. Id. at 565.
42. 335 U.S. 281 (1948).
43. 339 U.S. 276 (1950).
44. This system provides that in a primary election, the candidate receiving
the highest vote in a county is entitled to its entire electoral vote, which ranges
from six for the most populous counties to two for most of the counties.
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citing Cotegrove, affirmed the dismissal of the petition, and declared
the issue to be political. The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas,
with whom Mr. Justice Black concurred, however, reasoned by im-
plication that the expediency or separation of powers theories could
not be argued to label the issue political. 4 5
In recent years there have been four cases in federal district courts
which are worthy of note. Perry v. Folson4 6 and Radford v. Gary47
involved situations where the federal courts were asked to compel
state legislatures to reapportion the voting districts of the state as
required by the state constitutions. The courts in both cases sustained
motions to dismiss on the ground that the issue was political. In both
of these cases there appears to be strong judicial opinion that if the
courts were to take jurisdiction they would be invading the hallowed
ground of states' rights, an improper thing for a federal court to do.
In a third case, Remmey v. Smith,4 the court held that the case was
premature in that the Pennsylvania legislature was in session and
might reapportion in that term. While the court expressly refused to
rule on its jurisdiction, there is a strong expression in the case that
had it so ruled the issue would have been regarded as political29
The remaining case, although not the most recent case, seems to rep-
resent a far more modern approach. In Dyer v. Kazuhisa Abe 0 the
district court of Hawaii ruled that it had jurisdiction to hear a case in
which the plaintiff requested that the court cause the Territory of
45. Moreover, no decree which we need enter would collide with Congress or
with the election. Georgia need not be remapped politically. The Georgia
legislature need not take new action after our decree. There is no necessity
that we supervise an election. There need be no change or alteration in
the place of the election, its time, the ballots that are used, or the regula-
tions that govern its conduct .... The impact of the decree would be on
the tallying of votes and the determination of what names go on the general
election ballot .... [Cjonsiderations, which led Mr. Justice Rutledge to
conclude in Colegrove v. Green that the Court should not exercise its
equity powers in that election, are lacking here. There is a time to act....
Relief an be certain. No conflict with any policy of Congress is possible.
There is no overhauling of the State's electoral process. 339 U.S. at 280-81
(1950).
46. 144 F. Supp. 874 (N.D. Ala. 1956).
47. 145 F. Supp. 541 (W.D. Okla. 1956), aff'd per curiam, 352 U.S. 991 (1957).
48. 102 F. Supp. 708 (E.D. Pa. 1951).
49. To interpolate into these provisions [Section 1 of the fifteenth amendment
of the U.S. Constitution and section 31 of Title 8, U.S.C.] the right that
an individual's vote in an election for state offices should not be diluted by
unequal apportionment but should be equal in weight to each other vote
cast in the state would be legislative action by judicial pronouncement.
Id. at 712.
50. 138 F. Supp. 220 (D. Hawaii 1956), rev'd per curiam, 256 F.2d 728 (9th
Cir. 1958), because amendment of Organic Act made the question moot.
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Hawaii to be reapportioned in accordance with the law. Chief Judge
McLaughlin distinguished the case from Colgrove on the ground that
no federal-state relationship existed between the United States and the
Territory of Hawaii. Although two of the previously discussed cases 1
distinguished the Dyer case on this point, there is no doubt that Chief
Judge McLaughlin's language reflects a growing opinion that the
courts must intervene in this area, regardless of historical precedent.
As he states in the opinion:
Reasons of delicacy should no longer stay the judicial hand....
We are not saying each citizen must always have the same vote.
Political institutions may invoke geographic representation. How-
ever, where the fundamental law provides for equal rights of
suffrage each citizen should have the right of judicial redress if
the law is violated.52
It does not appear that any practical grounds exist for the applica-
tion of the political question doctrine in these malapportionment cases.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter suggested in the Colgrove case that the Court
was not competent to remap the districts of Illinois. Of course, there
is no question that this is a correct statement; however, as Mr. Justice
Black pointed out in his dissent in Colegrove, 53 the Court was being
asked to declare a state apportionment bill invalid, a declaration which
it had willingly made when so asked in an analogous case, Smiley v.
Holm." If the Court had given relief, the election of representatives
could have been held at large. If, as Mr. Justice Frankfurter says, this
is a problem for the people to solve by exercising their political rights,
is it not possible that the courts should provide for judicial redress in
those situations where the exercise of political rights has been abro-
gated by maldistricting? And, of course, expecting the legislators to
redistrict themselves out of office is political na'ivet.
Modern democracy has no room for the "rotten borough." If we
must weigh the usefulness of the political question doctrine, as applied
in this case on the one hand, against the eradication of the rotten
borough on the other, the political question doctrine must retreat.
If, as has been suggested heretofore, the doctrine of political ques-
tion should not be applied to the malapportionment cases, neither
should it be applied to the analogous situation found in Gomillion v.
Light foot.55
As Judge Brown points out in his dissent in Gomillion, this is a case
of first impression. 6 No other case has been found where a Negro
51. Perry v. Folsom, supra note 46, and Radford v. Gary, supra note 47.
52. Note 50 supra, at 236.
53. 328 U.S. at 566.
54. 285 U.S. 355 (1932).
55. 270 F.2d 594 (5th Cir. 1959).
56. Id. at 606.
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has been absolutely denied the right to vote by the device of a gerry-
mander. It is submitted, however, that the situation in this case is
merely an extension of the situation found in the malapportionment
cases. In the latter cases the votes of the aggrieved parties were di-
luted to the extent that they were partially disenfranchised. The
Gomillion case carries the disenfranchisement one step further and
makes it total. For the court to refuse jurisdiction because the statute
does not discriminate on its face, is to be blind to the statute's effect
and to ignore the oft-repeated maxim that the court condemns sophisti-
cated as well as simple-minded methods of discrimination.
In one of the "white primary" cases, Nixon v. Herndon,7 Justice
Holmes refused to entertain the argument that the right to vote was a
political question. No doubt states, acting through their legislatures,
should ordinarily not be questioned as to the wisdom and reasonable-
ness of their enactments. But the fourteenth and fifteenth amend-
ments of the Constitution will have little meaning if they cannot be
judicially protected from discriminatory encroachment by biased legis-
latures.
Nor does this case present any practical grounds for the application
of the political question doctrine. The court, of course, is not com-
petent to remap Tuskegee, but it could declare the act invalid, which
would have the effect of restoring the former boundaries.
A long line of cases in the federal courts have declared the sanctity
of the voting right58 That the court should countenance its abridge-
ment by one of the oldest and most disreputable instruments of politi-
cal opportunism, the gerrymander, is intolerable. As stated so well
by the court in Dyer v. Kazuhisa Abe, 9 "The whole thrust of today's
legal climate is to end unconstitutional discrimination."60
The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in this case.61 It is ear-
nestly hoped that Gomillion will serve as an apt vehicle for the court
to modify its stand on the political question doctrine as stated in Cole-
grove v. Green2 and South v. Peters.63
57. 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
58. See, e.g., United States v. Saylor, 322 U.S. 385 (1944) ; Smith v. Allwright,
821 U.S. 649 (1944); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941); Nixon v.
Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927); Guinn v.
United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915).
59. 138 F. Supp. 220 (D. Hawaii 1956).
60. Id. at 236.
61. 362 U.S. 916 (1960).
62. 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
63. 339 U.S. 276 (1950).
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